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Abstract. The article presents the outline for the theory of ideological space. The ideological properties of space are reconsidered 
by the juxtaposition of Lefebvre’s and Bourdieu’s theories. The resultant reconciliation points towards the notion of spatial critique 
of ideology as well as the possibility of employing ideology for critique of space. The notion of a test (as characterized by Boltanski) 
is introduced to show the importance of capabilities of actors and objects in the process of critique. The article emphasizes the 
exceptional significance of architecture for the construction of critical positions. The architecture is described as a form of a test. In 
so doing, the architecture is characterized as one of the essential elements of possible social emancipation. In effect, both the social 
responsibilities of the architecture and its critical role are underscored.
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Introduction
Henri Lefebvre postulates a science of the city which 
could become a cornerstone of urban life in his work 
“Theses on the City, the Urban and Planning” (2000). 
However, as he observes, understanding of a city is in-
sufficient because “a social and political force capable of 
putting these means into oeuvres is equally indispens-
able” (Lefebvre 2000:178). This thesis is a call for the 
emergence of a power institution which would allow for 
the planning of urban society and, at the same time, an 
emphasis of the necessity to construct a physical space 
that would be in accordance with social needs. In this 
article I shall attempt to analyze the possibility of using 
ideology as a starting point for the creation of a political 
force in space by means of architecture.
The ideological properties of space have now 
been naturalized in urban studies and are currently 
treated as being somewhat obvious. Various attempts 
to explain and overcome the issue of ideology with 
regards to space and architecture (see for instance: 
Castells 1977; Tafuri 1998) prove insufficient. Most of 
these approaches suffer from inadequate positioning 
of ideology with regard to architecture, which either 
strengthens the opposition between them or considers 
ideology in strictly political terms (Cuthbert 2006) and 
concentrates on material production of totalitarian and 
authoritarian states. For precisely this reason it is re-
quired to revisit the problem in order to firstly, grasp 
it theoretically, and secondly, to show its critical po-
tential. It is necessary to enunciate in what ways space 
is simultaneously a product and a producer mediating 
social relations (Goonewardena 2004: 168). Although a 
relational approach to society, ideology and space may 
seem like a postmodern gimmick (relational, so maybe 
relative!); at the same time it is one of the few ways 
of comprehending and offering criticism of contem-
porary cities and urbanization. As a social construct 
each of these things has a very concrete and material 
facet. In the first section of the article, I shall attempt 
to show how space is both ideological and political. In 
a more radical way, the issue is space as materialized 
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ideology. To describe that issue it is possible to draw on 
the traditional Marxist theory of ideology, especially 
as per Althusser (1994). However, this tradition does 
not provide us with fully satisfactory answers, mainly 
because of its underpinning of the strict separation of 
reality and illusion (science and ideology).
The critique of existing relations and the emergence 
of new social and spatial models are virtually inevit-
able. It is therefore necessary to investigate ideological 
socio-spatial relations in order to establish critical pos-
itions which would be able to contend with the domin-
ating powers of today. For many reasons the position of 
external critique is no longer tenable, if ever it was. It is 
not to say, however, that the domination is all-encom-
passing and critique impossible. The problem is rather 
with the invention and employment of ideologies, 
values, norms and resources which would be strong 
enough to break with existing relations of dominations. 
Contrary to unifying approaches to space and society, 
such as globalization or world cities discourses, possib-
ilities of critique exist in the internally and horizontally 
divided social structure, which allows for shifting from 
one position to another. Spatial dimension is of crucial 
importance because it binds traditionally understood 
ideological struggles with the concrete and material 
characteristics of people and objects.
The second and third sections of the article will try 
to explain the key position of architecture and build-
ings in the context of social and spatial critique. Of par-
ticular help will be the analytical framework proposed 
by sociologists from the so-called French pragmatic 
school, especially the works of Luc Boltanski. I shall 
not be attempting to simply apply this framework to 
the analysis of space, but rather to show that certain 
elements of this “sociology of critique” (as it is some-
times called in contrast to critical sociology) may prove 
useful for the analysis of the social production of space. 
In the case of architecture, the key element is a category 
of test. The general question is about the specific con-
ditions and strength of arguments which would allow 
being critical in the first place, given that “everything is 
ideological”. And why is space and architecture of such 
importance for the creation of a strong social critique?
Ideologies and space
It is somewhat customary in urban studies to recall 
Henri Lefebvre’s work while analyzing spatial relations 
(Kipfer et al. 2008: 1–23). It is not the case with Pierre 
Bourdieu. With very few exceptions (e. g. Harvey 1987; 
Savage 2011) his sociological work has not been used 
by urban theorists and researchers. Indeed, he seems 
to have been preoccupied with the questions regarding 
time and its different social usages. However, spatial 
issues have also been very important to him, to the 
extent that his “The Social Structures of Economy” 
(2005) is essentially a socio-spatial analysis. Similarly, 
the importance of space to Bourdieu is evident in “The 
Weight of the World” (1999) where meticulous, almost 
ethnographic descriptions of neighbourhoods, houses 
or interiors are at least as meaningful as interviews 
for the analytic description of social problems. I will 
try to show that Bourdieu’s social theory may also be 
helpful with regard to the investigation of the ideo-
logies of space, not only because of his preference for 
spatial terms (such as field, position, game or social 
space). Juxtaposition of Lefebvre and Bourdieu may 
seem unorthodox inasmuch as their theoretical work 
was distinct and their role in the political and intellec-
tual life of France dissimilar, despite the fact that the 
latter became increasingly engaged in political matters, 
assuming to some extent the position of the “public 
intellectual” vacant after the death of Foucault (see: 
Swartz 2005). The former is widely known to have been 
active in French political life from as early as the 1940s 
(Stanek 2011).
Lefebvre does not go beyond a typical definition 
of ideology as a discourse even though he attempts to 
situate it in the context of social practices (2010: 44). On 
the other hand, Bourdieu is critical towards the notion 
of ideology in general, mainly because of its previous 
misuse and association with “false consciousness”, and 
uses instead the term illusion or doxa. As stated by him, 
ideology as a term is compromised for it is unreason-
ably related to issues of consciousness and the possib-
ility of gaining pure knowledge (Bourdieu, Eagleton 
1994: 266). At the same time, the both abovementioned 
positions are encumbered with a typical mistake which 
has to do with an attempt to find a position external to 
ideological constraints. This kind of position is espe-
cially difficult to take and sustain in the context of the 
theory of space. It is so because, perhaps paradoxically, 
in space there are no external positions, at best we can 
talk about centre – periphery or in-between positions. 
Therefore the explanation of the issue of ideological 
space can be undertaken with the help of Lefebvre and 
Bourdieu on the condition that their theories are mu-
tually reconsidered. In this article Bourdieu’s work also 
is significant because it is representative of the critical 
sociology the shortcomings of which must be overcome 
in order to formulate a new critique of ideologies in 
space. At the same time it is one of the things shared by 
Bourdieu and Lefebvre. The former brilliantly showed 
how domination works in a society and how the social 
structure is permanently reproduced almost to the 
extent of being fixed. The latter is known to be more 
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optimistic and still gives us hope that there are dialect-
ical paths towards a spatial urban revolution (Lefebvre 
2000: 147–159, 2003).
The most important theoretical innovation of 
Bourdieu, which can be found in “Outline of a Theory 
of Practice” (1995), is the surpassing overstepping 
of traditional opposition between the social struc-
ture (structuralism, functionalism, etc.) and the in-
dividual (phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, 
etc.) through an attempt to understand their mutual 
relations (see: Joas, Knöbl 2011). His aim was not to 
reconstruct strict division between scientific terms but 
rather to relationally connect different social strands 
in order to create a better understanding of society.
The problem with achieving this aim stems above all 
from the fact that sociology is a logical science. Thus it 
is almost impossible to describe social relations without 
blurring the definitions of terms which are involved in 
those relations. It is noticeable in one of Bourdieu’s cent-
ral theoretical achievements, habitus. Throughout his 
writings he struggles to provide a proper definition of 
habitus, which ranges from famous “structured struc-
tures predisposed to function as structuring structures” 
(Bourdieu 1990: 53) to comprehending it as the only dur-
able ground for freedom in action (1999: 340). It is to 
some extent analogous to Lefebvre’s spatial triad (2010). 
However, it is noticeable that by identifying spatial triad 
as a dialectical construct, to a large extent Lefebvre 
avoids the problems of definitions and at the same time 
maintains clearer boundaries between the three ele-
ments (see: Kipfer 2008: 29). However, for exactly this 
reason Lefebvre’s positioning of ideology within spatial 
relations is limiting its critical capacities, even though it 
is directly related both to the material sphere and every-
day life (2010: 90). Bourdieu’s fuzzy definitions and situ-
ating habitus between what is given and what is active, 
as both embodied and material structure reproducing 
social relations, is what allows us to see ideology as also 
having different forms, including a spatial one.
It can be compared to Althusser’s remark that “not 
spiritual but material existence of ‘ideas’ or other ‘rep-
resentations’ is indeed necessary if we are to advance 
in our analysis of the nature of ideology” (1994: 125). 
He is even closer to Bourdieu’s theory of practice in ob-
serving that “an ideology always exists in an apparatus, 
and its practice, or practices. This existence is material” 
(1994: 126). It brings us closer to the notion of ideolo-
gical space, albeit the issue of relation between ideo-
logy and space still remains. Against the structuralist 
orientation of Althusser, it cannot be claimed that it is 
a one-way relationship in which dominating groups 
or classes impose their ideologies on the dominated 
and therefore ensure the reproduction of the mode of 
production. Moreover, his insistence on the division 
between ideology and science can hardly be supported 
(see: Eagleton 1991: 136–146). It is evident especially in 
a city and space in general, which is constantly trans-
forming, persistently being practiced and recreated, 
sometimes against the interests of dominating groups.
Likewise, architecture can be considered a mater-
ialized ideology, but such that is not given once and 
forever. It is not so just because of the ageing of mater-
ials or going out of fashion. The reason is in the very 
nature of architecture as a material process, which has 
different functions depending on the context, users or 
historical circumstances and is to a large extent de-
termined by complicated methods of construction. 
Hence, the investigation of resilience and reproduc-
tion of ideology should not concentrate on material 
construction itself, but rather on the functions which it 
supports in the context of production of practices and 
habituses in everyday life. Žižek (1994) notices some-
thing similar when he observes that ideology is not 
about “true” or “false” (i. e. about the logical relation 
to “how things are”) but rather about its functionality 
within existing power relations.
Similarly, in space it is irrelevant whether a build-
ing epitomises power relations but rather to what 
extent it maintains existing relations of domination. 
Functions of ideological space consist in the fact that 
space determines a scope of possible social practices 
and therefore influences people’s habituses in their very 
material aspect (Bourdieu, Eagleton 1994: 269). In the 
traditional theory of ideology of Marxist orientation 
a social change is associated with the possibility of 
gaining true knowledge of social relations which would 
help emancipation. However, in the context of material 
ideology, a social change is possible mainly through 
transformation of spatial arrangements which are cap-
able of fixing or stabilizing habituses and enable do-
mestication. In most cases it is not change we observe, 
but reproduction and stabilization of social relations 
in space. According to Bourdieu, “part of the inertia 
of the structures of social space results from the fact 
that they are inscribed in physical space and cannot be 
modified except by a work of transplantation, a moving 
of things and uprooting and deporting of people, which 
itself presupposes extremely difficult and costly social 
transformation” (Bourdieu et al. 1999: 124). I will try 
to argue that transformation is nevertheless possible 
without extraordinary means.
The issue of ideological space also implies actual 
transparency or naturalization of space. Very rarely 
is space considered truly ideological, and the space of 
everyday life particularly so. Following Bourdieu, it is 
possible to say that because of that it is even more ideo-
logical for it is part of unquestionable doxa, and “by 
using doxa we accept many things without knowing 
83Journal of Architecture and Urbanism, 2014, 38(1): 80–89
them, and that is what is called ideology” (Bourdieu, 
Eagleton 1994: 268). Therefore on the one hand there 
is a space, which although created by ideological pro-
cesses, functions as reality and on the other the prac-
tical difficulty of questioning this reality. Gaining 
knowledge of spatial relations is not enough. When 
dealing with material space a person is engaged in real 
illusio, an ideological relation based on the impossibil-
ity of taking an external position, stepping aside and, 
in consequence gaining a potential for change. After 
all it is much easier to define theoretically one’s own 
position in space than to practically surpass it by bod-
ily transcendence or material transformation. At the 
same time, it is this materiality that enables change 
which is not only on the level of representation but also 
substantially differentiated. The critique of spatial re-
lations depends thus not on knowledge of space but 
primarily on the interrelationship of practical everyday 
problems and material apparatuses. It chimes to some 
extent with Lefebvre’s spatial triad, only here the issue 
is the relation between spaces of representation and 
spatial practices on the one hand and representations 
of space (including ideology) on the other.
Space and architecture can be considered ideo-
logical for another reason related to the issue of the 
naturalization of materiality. Space as a resource is 
finite. Construction of a building or a bigger project 
is ideological. It requires group level mobilization and 
involves many people and material as well as non-ma-
terial things. More importantly, building means a 
choice from many potential solutions and material-
ization (realization) of only one of them. In that sense 
building is of a paradoxical and double nature, both 
positive (in creation of something new) and negative 
(in rejection of a variety of possibilities).
Architecture is ideological not only because it de-
termines practices and shapes habituses, but also be-
cause it is in fact an answer to the question of those 
future determinations. It answers the question “what 
will be?” at least as strongly as to the question of “what 
is?” It also means that it articulates dominant political 
powers and configurations because not every group has 
equal footing to decide about architectural answers. 
Architects and urbanists cannot be considered a priv-
ileged group either. As Leach notices, “The very pres-
ence of architecture gives it a social impact, so that any 
‘negativity’, any critical capacity within architecture, is 
all but cancelled by the ‘positivity’ of its presence. (…) 
The very physicality of architecture always threatens 
to install a new status quo, and undermines its capa-
city to be ‘subversive’” (1999: 116). The same can be 
said of architecture the function of which is utilitarian 
and which is rarely viewed as aesthetic, such as ware-
houses, transportation systems and projects or social 
housing. The answers advocated by architectural and 
urban planning are not final, because, as Massey (2005: 
10–11) points out, space is processual and entails the 
possibility of the existence of multiplicity and diversity. 
However, actual as well as perceived realization of this 
multiplicity is very difficult. To put it differently, despite 
the existence of complicated spatial relations and con-
current ideologies, what we observe is a rather constant 
reproduction of domination throughout history, tech-
nological innovation notwithstanding. It is again the 
same issue of functionality of ideology in space, which 
in Bourdieusian terms can be called material generative 
structure, simultaneously and “as if by magic” creating 
and created by society.
The abovementioned arguments can be considered 
as showing the factual impossibility of critique, espe-
cially such that would not fall back into existing ideo-
logical systems. Nevertheless, if we agree on the fact of 
ideological space, it is a strategic error to look for an 
external non-ideological position. In contrary, it is more 
productive and reasonable to use existing ideologies for 
the purpose of critique. If everything can be deemed 
ideological, the only way forward is to submit even more 
ideological propositions. Moreover, the characteristic of 
being ideological is quite complicated in itself, in spite 
of its apparent self-evidence. In practical (especially 
everyday) critique claiming everything ideological is 
too general and insufficient. As in the example of urban 
sociology and urban studies, ideology is often simultan-
eously exposed, overlooked and treated as natural, which 
actually enhances ideological functioning.
It is also necessary to point out the conditions in 
which emphasizing ideological space can be used as 
a critical tool. Externality of ideology exists only as 
much as it is still unrevealed, for instance in everyday 
practices. To return once again to Althusser and his 
notion of interpellation, it can be said that ideology can 
best be recognized not in space in general, but rather 
in its concrete functions, particularly in persons and 
objects. In other words, it is a task requiring movement 
on different levels. The existence of a building is not 
ideological in itself, but only within a wider ideological 
context and inscribed in a totality of relations: why is a 
building here and not elsewhere?, what purpose does 
it serve?, what is its influence and role?, does it create 
practices efficiently?, etc. It is even more crucial if we 
accept that, as Goonewardena posits, “space plays a 
mediating role between the social totality (our “real 
conditions of existence”) and the representation of 
our relationship to that totality (“ideology”)” (2004: 
168). The major task of critique is the analytical iden-
tification of the mediating role of ideology. The tool of 
critique is a test.
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Space and the testing of architecture
The notion of a test, which will be reinterpreted and 
reappropriated in this article in order to analyze archi-
tecture and move towards its critique, is taken from 
so-called French pragmatic sociology. This strand 
of sociology is unequivocally disapproving of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s critical sociology. However, there are au-
thors who call attention to the possibility of combin-
ing his theory with this “sociology of critique” (see: 
Bénatouïl 1999; Celikates 2006); although not without 
opposition from its proponents (Thévenot 2011; 
Blokker, Brighenti 2011). The notion of a test is one 
of the main categories of social analysis of conflicts 
in the context of values and justifications (Boltanski, 
Thévenot 2006). It is worth noting that the category 
was first used with a similar meaning by Bruno Latour, 
who emphasizes that it is related to a trial (even to 
a verb “to try”) rather than a test (Latour 1993:153). 
This double signification of trial/test is important to 
remember with regard to the ideological role of archi-
tecture outlined in this text.
It is necessary to summarize shortly the model of 
practical justifications presented by Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot in “On Justification”, even though 
it was revised by the authors themselves in their later 
studies. Boltanski and Thevenot have indentified six 
main models of polity, also called political forms of 
worth: inspired, domestic, fame, civic, market and 
industrial. Their claims are evident in both classical 
works of political philosophy and contemporary 
handbooks for entrepreneurs and union representat-
ives, which they used for their analysis. Those polities 
are at the same time bases for justifications in real-life 
situations of dispute and conflict. Social actors refer 
to one of the orders of worth in situations when their 
position is required to be explained or conflict needs 
to be resolved.
The basic social competence is the ability to gener-
alize one’s position, but also to shift between different 
kinds of justifications. For instance, sometimes it is 
necessary to present arguments related to someone’s 
role as a citizen (and the social rules of citizenship) 
and then change to the arguments of a market nature 
(efficiency, etc.). What is important is that the sort of 
arguments and justifications referred to by the actors 
depends mainly on situational conditions. A situation 
is not a free-floating discourse; it is strongly grounded 
and limited. Objects are a very important aspect of a 
situation and are active in a dispute, they can distort 
sharpness or “cleanness” of justification or be activated 
to present it strongly: “with the help of objects, which 
we shall define by their belonging to a specific world, 
people can succeed in establishing states of worth. 
A test of worth cannot be reduced to a theoretical de-
bate. It engages persons, in their bodily existence, in 
a world of things that serve as evidence, and in the 
absence of which the dispute does not have the material 
means for resolution by testing” (Boltanski, Thévenot 
2006: 131). Objects are therefore essential for the con-
struction of stability of worth within the orders. They 
may also be used for testing if it is needed (Boltanski, 
Thévenot 2006: 17).
Tests are defined in “On Justification” as “proced-
ures that are capable of reducing the uncertainty of a 
situation through the achievement of agreement as to 
the qualification of the beings involved. In this sense, 
a test encompasses both an evaluation according to a 
moral standard and an assessment according to the 
standard of truth” (Boltanski, Thévenot 2006: 360). 
Tests occur in situations which for different reasons 
require a clarification of the worth of the actors but 
also a new definition of the situation itself. Boltanski 
and Thévenot endeavour to show that in real situations 
practice of critique consists not in taking some external 
position but in changing one form of worth (and polity) 
for another.
The authors claimed that the model presented in 
“On Justification”, despite seemingly presenting a uni-
versal model of social practices and proposing gen-
eral sociology of critique, was limited to begin with 
(Basaure 2011: 362; see also critique of Honneth 2010). 
Indeed, the later works of Boltanski and Thévenot, in-
cluding research, individual or co-authored with oth-
ers, seem to confirm that this strand of moral sociology 
and economy of worth is a broader and variegated 
enterprise. Approaches later proposed separately by 
Boltanski and Thévenot could be useful for analysis of 
architecture. They both pay special attention to the role 
of objects in social situations (inheritance from Latour). 
But for the spatial theory of ideology, or problematic 
of ideological space Boltanski’s theories might prove 
more productive. In “Love and Justice as Competences” 
(2012) he developed a model of regimes of action, which 
greatly transcend the conflictual model described in 
“On Justification”. Apart from two regimes based on 
conflict (justification and violence) Boltanski identifies 
two regimes of peace: love (as agape) and one related 
to objects (Wagner 1999: 349). The latter is important 
inasmuch as it can be related to space and its stabilizing 
functions for social relations. Boltanski observes that 
“things tell people what to do (…); they keep people in 
place and propose constraints that play the role of tacit 
conventions capable of harmonizing people’s relation-
ships and their movements.” (2012: 70). The regime of 
objects depicted in such manner is indeed very close 
to Bourdieu’s and Lefebvre’s remarks.
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The notion of tests re-emerges in “The New Spirit of 
Capitalism” (2005) which Boltanski co-authored with 
Eve Chiapello. The book characterizes the emergence 
and dissemination in contemporary capitalism of an-
other polity, one based on the idea of a project. All the 
tests in the projectual polity are tests of strength. They 
are understood in this context as relating to the con-
tinuum local – global (in the systemic sense) and legit-
imization: “There is a sort of continuum which reaches 
from the unspecified tests of strength, in which you 
do not know which forces are at work, to the specified 
tests of strength, in which only one sort of force is used 
for the test so that it can be regarded as legitimate” 
(Basaure 2011: 374). In case of tests of strength the cru-
cial thing is a degree of formalization, or legitimization 
(Boltanski, Chiapello 2005: 32). The new spirit of cap-
italism is described as an ideology of a sort (Boltanski, 
Chiapello 2005: xx–xxi).
Chiapello (2003), after Ricoeur (1986) proposes 
the understanding of ideology which combines cul-
turalist and Marxist approaches. She locates the dis-
tortion effects of ideology as resulting from the sur-
plus of integrative function: “it is because ideology 
in its group integration function tends to legitimize 
a social order in its current state (trying to ensure 
the preservation and reproduction thereof) that it is 
a theatre of distortion” (Chiapello 2003: 160). This 
makes room for ideological critique, and one under-
taken not from an external position, but by the actors 
involved: “we therefore have a conception of ideology 
that can state distortion at any moment in time, since 
it is impossible to organise tests that are completely 
fair” (Chiapello 2003: 168). It is also worth remember-
ing that Boltanski (2011) noticed the functioning of 
ideology in his critical analysis of critical sociology. 
He observed however, that ideology is effective mostly 
in the best interests of the dominating classes for it 
allows the imposition of self-discipline on their mem-
bers and therefore enabling them to maintain their 
privileged position. The case is different for the dom-
inated classes, as for them what is crucial is the “re-
lationship between the condition of the systems that 
ensure running of reality – which can be more or less 
robust – and the condition of the collective systems 
actors can rely on to extricate themselves from the 
reality, challenge its validity and, above all, reduce its 
powers” (Boltanski 2011: 41). It is virtually in line with 
the Marxist hope, probably long gone, of the working 
class as being capable of critique, revolt and revolu-
tion. More importantly, it provides arguments for the 
possibility of utilizing concrete and local struggles 
and critiques, while preserving the general perspect-
ive of ideological space as the context of conflict.
In his characterization of “sociology of emancipa-
tion” Boltanski (2011) specifies three kinds of tests, two 
of which have critical potential. In principle, tests relate 
to a reality which engages social actors. This reality 
is not only discoursive but also material and entails 
objects used in or determining a situation.
Truth tests are a form of tests which are not critical 
but reassuring. They are undertaken in order to provide 
“consistency and saturation, a certain pre-established 
state of the relationship between symbolic forms and 
states of affairs, in such a way as to constantly recon-
firm it” (Boltanski 2011: 103). Their principle is repe-
tition, the task of which is to show a norm and thus 
they often employ tautologies (Boltanski 2011: 104). 
In general, the aim of truth tests is to maintain real-
ity as it is, which in turn renders it acceptable or even 
loved (Boltanski 2011: 105). It is somehow analogous 
to amor fati, described by Bourdieu in “Distinction” 
(1984). “The truth test unmasks a universe of signs by 
exhibiting it in its plenitude and consistency. It makes 
it manifest and gives lustre to what, in it, stands be-
hind the feeling of respect it inspires.” (Boltanski 2011: 
113). Interestingly, Boltanski observes that even though 
truth tests are uncritical, they can be unsuccessful, es-
pecially in the case of resistance from non-human act-
ors (objects, machines or animals). Hence even truth 
tests entail an element of uncertainty with regard to 
the state of reality and the possibility of its sustenance 
and reproduction.
Reality tests occur mostly in situations of dispute 
and have the potential of becoming violence. They 
enable testing of assertions about reality by confront-
ing them with their actual capabilities (Boltanski 
2011: 106). Reality tests rest on the difference between 
what is and what should be. Uncertainty of the real 
capabilities of people and things and their mutual 
relations is a very important element. These tests can 
either confirm the state of things or transform into cri-
tique. They employ recognition and proofs and lean 
towards compromise in order to validate realness of 
reality. “In and through acts, the reality test unmasks 
the powers concealed in the interiority of beings, so 
that the treatment accorded them is brought into har-
mony with what they really are and, in this way, the 
consistency and cohesion of a reality that most closely 
resembles the representations deployed by truth test is 
maintained – that is to say, a reality whose correctness 
is as one with justice” (Boltanski 2011: 113).
Existential tests are most useful for the critique of 
ideology in architecture and space. Contrary to the two 
previous types of tests, existential tests have noninsti-
tutional character and maintain individual, local and 
“lived” traits (Boltanski 2011: 107). They point towards 
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previously unrecognized and unidentified factors and 
facts and therefore often relate to individual experi-
ences, chiefly suffering. Existential tests are radical 
exactly because they are of a particular and often isol-
ated nature. This peripheral position enables them to 
question reality (Boltanski 2011: 108). To be politically 
and critically efficient existential tests demand gener-
alization. “(E)xistential test, at least when it ends up 
being formulated and made public, (…) unmasks the 
incompletness of reality and its contingency, by draw-
ing examples from the flux of life that make its bases 
unstable and challenge it, in such ways as to confront it 
with the inexhaustible, and hence impossible to total-
ize, reserve represented by the world” (Boltanski 2011: 
113). Such characterization of existential tests brings 
them close to what Lefebvre wrote about practices of 
everyday life of lived space as well as to his postulates 
for difference understood as providing a revolutionary 
potential (Kipfer 2008: 203).
Architecture as a test
Sociology of critique and Boltanski’s sociology of 
emancipation are not directly concerned with space 
or architecture. Nevertheless, I will argue that certain 
elements of these theories can be utilized for critical 
analysis. It is especially so as special attention is paid 
to objects as active elements in situations and tests. 
Furthermore, Boltanski himself tries to combine 
his own sociology of critique with critical sociology 
(of which Bourdieu is the main representative) and 
therefore to reformulate pragmatic sociology by in-
cluding normative aspects. It seems that similar refor-
mulation is also needed in contemporary critical urban 
studies, which on the one hand concentrate on the out-
wardly overwhelming power of neo-liberalism and on 
the other has difficulty in generalizing local problems 
like gentrification or privatization of commons and 
mobilizing protests. Ideological critique should not be 
used to condemn enemies but rather to facilitate con-
struction of practical and institutional solutions and 
make them available to social actors in their everyday 
problems (see: Celikates 2006: 36). Critique of space 
and architecture is in this context vital because of its 
object which is of a practical, everyday, material and 
common nature.
To characterize architecture as a test is not to simply 
use sociological categories for the analysis of materiality 
or the depiction of the building process. The notion of a 
test enables consideration of architecture as functional 
and instrumental for the confirmation or negation of 
existing lived reality on the one hand, and attribution of 
the critical role of architecture on the other.
Why then can architecture be considered a test? 
Firstly, architecture, understood as a process of con-
struction and building of material structures, has a 
direct inf luence on society. Secondly, socio-spatial 
systems are inherently unstable and therefore can 
be characterized, after Lefebvre (2010), as processes 
of the social production of space. These suppositions 
are related to the issue of ideological space, outlined 
above. Considering three kinds of tests, we can see 
that architecture is, in a covert or overt way, similarly 
burdened with providing solutions to social problems. 
In principle, architecture provides material and prac-
tical answers to the questions about reality. Alike tests, 
it basically settles arguments about accepted actions or 
practices and organizes lifeworlds. Architectural solu-
tions are always provisional and elaborated with un-
equal share from various social actors and institutions, 
which leaves open the possibility of critique. Moreover, 
its aim can be either reproduction or innovation of ex-
isting reality and social relations. The unequal status of 
the social actors involved in architecture is especially 
striking in most cases when participation in the pro-
cess of construction is restricted and excludes every-
one except experts, for instance during architectural 
competitions or in professional associations. It serves 
the purpose of making the architectural test purer by 
the elimination of criteria not directly related to ar-
chitectural discourse and practice. At the same time, 
it disables critique of a different sort, which would be 
able to reveal and include aspects such as social costs 
and responsibilities, and use a particular building for 
ideological critique.
Architecture as a truth test which confirms exist-
ing reality is probably most common. It is so because 
of the dominated situation of architecture as a profes-
sion, in spite of its ostensible autonomy (Jones 2009). 
Confirmation of reality by architecture is evident for 
instance in repetition of similar material structures 
in different geographical, historical and social cir-
cumstances. It works to some extent as a simple and 
planned misperception of architecture as a represent-
ation of society in material forms. However, it must 
be noted that especially in this case the context is cru-
cial. For instance, a housing estate of tower blocks can 
be considered a truth test in modern Europe, but not 
necessarily in contemporary cities in Asia (see: Yuen, 
Yeh 2011) or in European cities in the 1940s when they 
oftentimes were one of the means of social change (see: 
Hall 2002). Similarly, suburbia – the epitome of archi-
tectural repetition – can be either strengthening exist-
ing social relations or constitute major changes in city 
functions in a wider context (King 2004: 97–110) and 
is perceived by people as utopian (see: Fishman 1987). 
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Anyhow, the main aim of architecture as a truth test 
is as best as possible reproduction of socio-spatial sys-
tems and relations of power by means appropriate to 
the existing context.
Reality tests as potentially reformative situations 
can be identified in architecture which serves to correct 
or amend the system. Thus it is usually both innovative 
(especially in formal aspects), conservative and con-
firmative. In other words, it takes into consideration 
the resolution of controversial or debatable issues or 
even crises in a way which tends toward preservation 
of existing socio-spatial arrangements. Iconic build-
ings, as characterized by Sklair (2010) can serve as 
an example of an architectural reality test. It is also 
noticeable in the postmodern architecture in late 
20th century Poland, where postmodernism was not 
a comprehensive paradigm, but rather an answer to 
the state-controlled urban design programmes. New 
postmodern buildings were projected and erected in 
a manner which can be called a correction of the aes-
thetic and architectural system, but without enough 
power to overcome problems of central planning (see: 
Klein 2013; Gzowska, Klein 2013).
Architecture as an existential test is perhaps the most 
complicated case, mainly because it brings forward the 
issue of (im)possibility of comprehensive critique. The 
other reason might be that architecture is considered to 
be for architects (i. e. experts), which hinders its wider 
social functions. Certain trends in Modernist architec-
ture, as described by Frampton (2004: 248–279) included 
strong postulates of social change. Leach, after Jameson 
(2008), arguments that Modernism disappointed hopes 
for wide-ranging change because it was not able to sep-
arate an aesthetic revolution from a social one (1999: 
115). Jameson himself noted that “the symbolic act of 
high modernism, which seeks to resolve contradiction 
by stylistic fiat (even though its resolution may remain 
merely symbolic), is of a very different order and quality 
from that of postmodernism that simply ratifies the con-
tradictions and fragmented chaos all around it by way of 
an intensified perception of, a mesmerized and well-nigh 
hallucinogenic fascination with, those very contradic-
tions themselves” (2008: 369). Significantly, we now have 
to do with an architectural trend which Hatherley calls 
pseudomodernism. He shows that pseudomodernism 
shares with postmodernism its complete submission 
to market relations, being at the same aesthetically 
Modernist (2010: xx). Nevertheless, Leach argues that 
architecture can be an instrument of social revolution 
since it is more bound with society than other forms of 
aesthetic expression (Leach 1999: 115).
It is also worth noting that an architectural test can 
be undertaken at different scales and can refer equally 
well to whole buildings or larger urban plans as well 
as to particular apartments, public spaces or typically 
utilitarian structures such as bridges, roads, etc. In 
other words, ideological and social tests can function 
with regard to various spaces, even when different 
forms of social life need to be preserved.
Conclusion: testing architecture
The inf luence of architecture on society is under-
theorized. Moreover, architectural and urban plans, 
although ostensibly innovative, are actually subor-
dinated to the game rules of the market which render 
them instrumental in the reproduction of the social 
relations of domination. Nonetheless, overlooking the 
social aspects of architecture and space in general, and 
especially their critical potential, is not going to help. 
The postulate of social responsibilities and roles of ar-
chitecture do not come from desperation, but from a 
simple fact that without spatial changes social change 
is inconceivable. “Space assumes regulatory role when 
and to the extent that contradictions – including the 
contradictions of space itself – are resolved” (Lefebvre 
2010: 420). The role of architecture is equally to enable 
conflicts and struggles and to propose their solutions. 
Furthermore, architecture as much as possible should 
have a character of an existential test, which would 
enable connections between general level and local 
struggles. “The transformation of society presupposes 
a collective ownership and management of space foun-
ded on the permanent participation of the ‘interested 
parties’, with their multiple, varied and even contra-
dictory interests. It thus also presupposes confronta-
tion (…)” (Lefebvre 2010: 422).
Such tasks are already present but insufficiently ap-
preciated in architectural practice. The main thing is to 
accept fundamental uncertainty and the contingency 
of space as well as formal and, above all, the social re-
sponsibility of architecture. Only then is it possible 
to multiply architectural existential tests regarding 
prevalent relations of domination. In other words, the 
postulate here is to acknowledge vital openness of space 
and its critical social importance. While today it is an 
arduous task to even imagine alternatives for market 
capitalism, it is still more important not to ignore little 
struggles and resistances. These instances are always 
stronger when they regard space or have spatial exist-
ence. Hence the role of the architect is to design struc-
tures capable of generalization of emancipatory prac-
tices. This role is strengthened because of the practical 
competences and technical skills which architects and 
planners undoubtedly possess, under the condition of 
accepting dependent role of architecture (Till 2009). 
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It is also worth noting that every uncertainty, conflict 
and test in space can to various degrees be critically 
utilized. For instance, as numerous examples of public 
art testify, it is easier to conduct an existential test in 
public space than in one’s private or intimate space, 
although it is achievable.
Perhaps contrary to widespread approaches, ar-
chitectural practice is not about designing innovative 
structures while overawed by technology, size or height. 
In fact, it would be in accordance with mid-twenti-
eth century urban capitalism, and as Goonewardena 
points out, “the central lesson of the 20 century for 
planning [and architecture] cannot be forgotten: not 
to trust either the ‘market’ or the ‘expert’ (2003: 215). 
On the contrary, the aim is to include architecture into 
the realm of social critique of material ideologies. It is 
effectively what Jameson postulated a few decades ago: 
“The essential would (…) be that they [architects] are 
able to form conceptions and Utopian images of such 
projects, against which to develop a self-consciousness 
of their concrete activities in this society” (2008: 361). 
As I tried to argue, those conceptions and utopias do 
not necessarily have to grow from some external posi-
tion or fully alternative visions as they rarely are groun-
ded in experience and their introduction is all the more 
problematic. Rather, possible critiques are already here, 
within – or between – relations of dominations in their 
material and concrete manifestations. “This concrete 
existence of radically different spaces elsewhere (…) is 
what objectively opens the possibility for the coming 
into being and development of ‘counterhegemonic val-
ues’ here” (Jameson 2008: 361).
To return to social critique as envisioned by 
Boltanski, it is worth recalling his remarks which can 
easily be adapted to critical strategies of space: “critique 
cannot be determined solely by its opposition to the 
established order of reality, considered in its opaque 
generality, but also, or above all, by its reference to pos-
sibilities, already identifiable in the experience of the 
world, of which suffering and desire are the manifesta-
tions in the flux of life” (2011: 113). What is important, 
critique of space is not just negative. On the contrary, it 
allows practical and material shaping of the ideologies 
of change by way of unceasing tests. Similarly, it is not 
only the indignant moaning against the all-pervading 
neo-liberalism which is easily neutralised or natural-
ised. Rather, it is the strengthening of critical practice, 
which is anyway inevitable because of the ideological 
mediation of limited space. It is not about transcend-
ence, because critical practice is already there – within 
and between the material ideologies of space.
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